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IN HIS INTRODUCTION to the preceding volume in this series Gregory S. 
Kealey tentatively concluded that the 1933-34 RCMP Security Bulletins 
(those that were available) revealed "a general strengthening" of the 
Communist Party of Canada (CPC). He also suggested that an upturn in 
party fortunes could be dated from the spring of 1934, when a Toronto jury 
acquitted A.E. Smith, National Secretary of the Canadian Labour Defence 
League (CLDL), from a charge of sedition. Smith's acquittal certainly 
contrasted sharply with the fate, two years earlier, of the CPC's Political 
Bureau, and in the process made their continued incarceration increasingly 
problematic. It was, however, more a culmination than a beginning, the 
climax of a year in which in its various incarnations the still illegal CPC 
embedded itself, really for the first time, in the Canadian working-class 
movement. Communists, for example, strengthened their track record as 
the most consistent and persistent supporters of Canada's unemployed. 
Smith's acquittal benefited directly from the Free Speech Fight waged 
throughout the summer of 1933 by Toronto's Communist unemployed 
activists; their successful struggle to reclaim the public spaces of the Queen 
City for the propagandizing of revolutionary politics helped shift public 
opinion away from the reflexive anticommunism of the early 1930s. Also 
in this period the Workers' Unity League (WUL) established "red" trade 
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imionism as a serious force in the ranks of organized labour. Its "March 
Campaign" coincided with an economic upturn that gave a minority of 
industrial workers the confidence to call a halt to speed-up and wage cuts. 
All across Canada packets of red unionism emerged out of semi-clandestine 
perseverance. In Vancouver, the WUL rose apparently from nowhere to a 
position of authority on the waterfront, transforming the Vancouver and 
District Waterfront Workers' Association from a company union into the 
base of operations for a drive to organize longshoring and marine transport 
throughout British Columbia. In Winnipeg, WUL membership rose from 
170 in March to 955 in September. But if there was a single turning point 
in party fortunes, it probably occurred during the Stratford, Ontario, furni-
ture strike in September and October 1933. Though not a total WUL 
victory, the Stratford strike represented, in the words of a leading non-com-
munist participant, "the best possible arrangement that could be made at 
that time," one that forced the manufacturers to recognize "the authority 
and the right of the worker to participate in the organization of the plant." 
After Stratford, the WUL had an identity based on achievement rather than 
simply aspiration. 
Lacking the relevant bulletins for the first half of the year, The Depres-
sion Years, Part I: 1933-1934 could not reflect the Toronto campaign or 
the significant progress of red unionism during the spring and sununer of 
1933. It could be forgiven for taking its lead from those state officials who 
often had difficulty seeing or acknowledging CPC advances, except when 
they were impossible to ignore. In the very first report in The Depression 
Years, Part I the RCMP Officer Commanding, Western Ontario, reported 
that "the revolutionary organizations are losing their hold upon the un-
employed masses, and that Communist activities throughout the district are 
practically at a standstill." In fact, during the next six months there was 
hardly an urban centre in Ontario which did not experience a rising level 
of unemployed and workplace struggle; whether it was Windsor, a key 
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target of WUL concentration, or the "company village" of Hespeler, which 
in December 1933 hosted one of the year's most militant strikes. 
Such occasional inaccuracies do not vitiate the documentary utility of 
the Security Bulletins; rather, they actually help expose the mindset of 
certain state officials. The bulletins are more widely useful. One is struck 
again and again by their matter-of-fact realism. One must remember that 
these documents were tailored to suit an audience of ministers and officials 
who would not have appreciated being the recipients of misinformation. 
Hence hopeful editorializing is the exception rather than the rule. The 
bulletins offer in accessible form a massive quantity of information on the 
CPC — which completely dominated the RCMP's attentions — from 
which the reader may judge independently whether Communism was 
advancing or declining. Thankfully, apart from the unfortunate deletions, 
the 193S bulletins present a reasonably complete and continuous scrutiny 
of the CPC during a pivotal year. 
If one theme dominates the present volume, it is the crystallization of 
the United Front and its rapid passage over into the People's or Popular 
Front. By the end of 1935 almost all of the style, tone and temper of Third 
Period Communism had been buffed and bevelled into conformity with the 
new approach emphasized by the Seventh (and last) World Congress of the 
Communist International (Comintern) in July 1935. Until the party line 
changed again in 1939, the CPC, like Comintern affiliates everywhere, 
sought to broaden its appeal by becoming respectable, constitutional, and 
patriotic. By December the party had shed its sectarian skin so effectively 
that leading members were having to defend themselves from the charge 
that the party had "changed its line and [was] becoming a 'pink' organiza-
tion.'" Sidney Sarkin neatly summarized the rationale of the United Front 
to a party unit meeting in Montréal. While the party's ultimate goal 
remained "a Soviet Canada," he explained, "a large portion of the workers 
are not prepared for Socialism, but were definitely opposed to fascism and 
war." Frustratingly, the RCMP report does not describe the context of 
Sarkin's speech. Was this criticism of the party's political trajectory 
internal? If so, it invites further research into how the party carried out the 
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ideological battle for the Popular Front. More importantly, perhaps, it 
questions the easy categorization of the party as monolithic or "Stalinist." 
The shift from Third Period to Popular Front was gradual; it was 
certainly incomplete by the end of 1935. Party trade union work is instruc-
tive here. At the start of the year the CPUS A formally "liquidated" its Trade 
Union Unity League (TUUL) and sent its members (many of whom had, 
in any event, been voting with their feet throughout 1934) back into the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL). Since the CPC always watched the 
goings-on in its sister party with keen interest, it surely knew that the going 
of the TUUL had implications for the WUL. As early as March — some 
four months in advance of the Seventh Congress — Tom Ewan informed 
a WUL rally that the WUL was willing to send its members into any 
reformist union — even into the Catholic Syndicates of Québec — to 
promote the goal of workers' unity. Ewan's statement underlined the 
rapidity of the unity process; it also, though certainly inadvertently, high-
lighted the limits of the WUL's self-ascribed commitment to rank-and-file 
democracy. Ewan did not lack authority in the party; he had, after all, been 
reinstated as WUL National Secretary immediately after his release from 
Kingston in October 1934. But who, we want to ask, gave him the 
mandate for this offer? Unfortunately, the bulletin does not refer to any 
audience response. When he proceeded to attack "Trotskyites and Loves-
toneites" (there were limits to unity!) for their hostility to the WUL, he was 
probably trying to mollify those WUL members who rejected his unity 
scenario. He insisted that the WUL had already demonstrated an ability 
'Sarkin, quoted in Bulletin No. 784, 4 December 1935. To describe the CPC as 
"Stalinist" in 1935 runs the danger of replacing analysis with rhetoric. Bryan 
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to draw "many reformist unions' into action around unemployment and 
"the war danger" and hence still had a role to play. The report does not 
reveal the precise nature of the role, largely one suspects because the issue 
had not been decided. 
What the bulletins cannot answer is why the WUL did not simply follow 
the TUUL into early liquidation. Focused narrowly on the party, and to 
some extent on the party's international obligations, the bulletins are less 
than sensitive to the domestic forces that shaped its policy. On the other 
hand, they do show that it was ultimately a Comintern directive that 
terminated the red union interlude. They also show that, even as forces 
beyond its control were making its future problematic, the WUL remained 
the outstanding organizer of the unorganized. The bulletins reveal in 
copious detail its activity in a host of industries and even in some locations 
where defeated strikes had ostensibly driven it out (Estevan, Hin Flon). 
Moreover, despite the pressure to abandon independence, it was combining 
new organizing work with increasingly effective left-wing oppositional 
activity in the reformist unions. We learn, for example, that it had a 
substantial presence in the huge CPR Angus locomotive repair shops in 
'Third Period' Sectarianism," The Vanguard, November-December 1932, and Bill 
Moriarty, "Eaors of Dual Unionism," letter to the editor, Toronto Daily Slur. 27 
July 1935. 
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Montréal; its shop unit produced a regular shop paper, The Headlight, with 
a claimed sale of 500 copies. The bulletins' coverage of CPC trade union 
policy demolishes some of the myths that still surround the WUL: it was a 
fly-by-night outfit; it exploited sporadic worker militancy for political 
purposes; it never really built organizations designed to last. Its continued 
vitality through 1935 indicates that Communists had a genuine commit-
ment to strengthening working class organization and collective power. 
The next volume in the scries, covering 1936, will show how the party's 
trade union influence not only survived but flourished after the liquidation 
of the WUL. 
If, in the early 1930s, party life revolved almost entirely around trade 
union and unemployed struggles, the broadening-out process of the later 
1930s involved the CPC in a much wider range of activities. With the 
release of the party leadership in the latter part of 1934 (see The Depression 
Years, Part I), the CLDL lost much of its raison d'être; the 1935 bulletins 
indicate that it was a declining force. In its place, however, two other 
"transmission belts" helped spread the party's influence across a wider 
spectrum of the working class and increasingly into the middle class. The 
Friends of the Soviet Union (FSU) and Canadian League Against War and 
Fascism (CLAWF) were formed respectively in 1930 and 1934. 
Launched during the height (or nadir?) of the Third Period, the FSU 
found that its initial project of building broad working-class solidarity for 
a Soviet Union encircled by hostile imperialisms remained pertinent to the 
new United Front line; indeed, it could now be extended outwards towards 
the middle class. Relatively little is known about the FSU, however, and it 
may be that its attraction remained class bound, confined mainly to work-
ing-class militants who were less enamoured of the domestic party than of 
the Soviet experiment. Was the FSU's national organizer James Cowan, 
as his name suggests, another of the Scottish immigrant radicals who made 
such a vivid impact on the CPC in the 1930s (several inhabit the pages of 
this collection: Sam Scarlett, another FSU stalwart; Jim Litterick, soon to 
become Canada's first Communist provincial legislator; Fred Collins and 
Jim Coleman [a.k.a. "Scotty" Houston], two of the WUL's most dynamic 
industrial organizers; and J.B. McLachlan — "Old Jim" — who in 1936 
left the party because he considered its application of the Seventh Congress 
decisions a "sad inarch to the right")? The FSU received a boost at the 
start of 1935 with the return from the USSR of the 1934 Canadian Workers' 
"Bulletin No. 747,6 March 1935; Bulletin No. 770, 28 August 1935. 
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Delegation. There had been similar delegations in the past, but never was 
a homecoming so effectively exploited. Returning delegates fanned out 
across the country, addressing scores of mass meetings — many recorded 
here — on the glories of Socialist Construction. Their predictably glowing 
reports were precisely what many audiences wanted. On occasion, how-
ever, if RCMP reports are to be believed, the message became tiresome and 
some listeners displayed a cynical edge in the traditional question and 
answer sessions. Vancouver delegate Pete Munro had to fend off a question 
that must have echoed through many a workers' hall: why, if he liked the 
USSR so much, had he not stayed there? At another meeting San Scarlett 
played on a theme that seemed to inspire party members: the liberating 
potential of the Red Army. Every one of its members, Scarlett claimed, was 
"working for the cause of the world revolution." Perhaps Canada's class 
fighters, who had been encouraged during the early 1930s to believe in the 
imminence of world revolution, could envisage the Red Army marching 
on Parliament Hill. One wonders, however, whether Scarlett's evocation 
of this prospect would have played well with the thousands who were 
moving towards the CLAWF, undoubtedly the party's most successful 
"front." 
According to CLAWF National Secretary A.A. McLcod, the organiza-
tion had 337,000 members in 1935! This figure can be taken with a handful 
of salt; it was originally arrived at by totting up the membership of every 
organization officially represented at the CLAWF founding conference in 
October 1934. Nevertheless, in its first full year of operations the 
CLAWF, which actually began life as the Canadian Youth League Against 
War and Fascism under the presidency of Stanley Ryerson, displayed a 
promising ability to reach forces hitherto untapped by the CPC. It drew 
in professionals, Jewish and Protestant religious leaders, and left-leaning 
(or sounding) labour unionists (All-Canadian Congress of Labour President 
A.A. Mosher attended the founding conference). It proved particularly 
attractive to labour and "progressive" women, to whose embryonic 
feminism it offered a variety of outlets. As Joan Sangster has shown, it also 
managed to convert the tendency towards absolute pacifism exhibited by 
some members of this group into an anti-fascism that could contemplate 
*For his reply, see Bulletin No. 745, 20 February 1935. 1 
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the use of force. Later volumes will show the development of the CLAWF 
(and its successor Canadian League for Peace and Democracy) as the 
agency of Popular Front mobilization. 
The growth of the "fronts" illustrates the coexistence of "residual" and 
"emergent" tendencies in party life. The FSU and CLAWF grew in part 
because the party consciously attenuated its control over them. But while 
these were organizations of sympathizers and "contacts," they remained 
"transmission belts"; not just vectors of ideological influence, but recruit-
ing agents for the organizational consolidation of the party. The CPC never 
ceased to emphasize the importance of party building. At a moment when 
revolutionary goals were in suspension, the exercise of long-range political 
influence through the CLAWF and its prominent non-party members was 
a viable tactic. But that suspension would not last for ever, and in the final 
conflict influence could never be as reliable as party di.scipline. Hence the 
party had to be built. We may reasonably infer that a growing proportion 
of new recruitment in the later 1930s originated in these two organiza-
tions. This raises questions which future volumes in the series will help 
answer: to what extent did the party see the Popular Front as a tactic, a 
temporary manoeuvre away from, but not a negation of the goal of a Soviet 
Canada? Was a different sort of recruit attracted to the party in the Popular 
Front years? How did they relate to the working-class — though invariably 
unemployed — militants who had joined during the grimmer times of the 
Third Period? What sort of party did the CPC become in 1937, 1938, and 
1939? 
The continued importance of party building is underlined here by the 
CPC's efforts in Québec. The Depression Years, Part I provides abundant 
evidence of the protracted struggle mounted by the party to break out of its 
British and Jewish redoubts into the mass of the Francophone working 
class. The Industrial Union of Needle Trades' Workers' (lUNTW) strike 
in the Montréal dress trade in August and September 1934 nay have been 
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another ofthose deceptive turning points where, beneath the appearance of 
defeat, lurked the foundations of qualitative advance. This bitter and bloody 
strike was undoubtedly a severe setback for the lUNTW and the party. 
Indeed, one hostile international unionist gloated, even before the formal 
end of the strike, communists were "not to be seen or heard" in the Montréal 
25 
garment distnct; they were "dead to the world." Nevertheless, in the 
months leading up to the strike lUNTW organizers had redoubled their 
efforts to break down the inter-ethnic rivalry between Jewish and French 
Canadian workers, especially between the "girls" of the trade. They had to 
"go visit many [French Canadian] parents ... and convince then that it's ... 
all right to belong to the union, that they will, because they now belong to 
the union, assume the dignity of labour." "Many parents," union leader 
Joshua Gershman later reported, "agreed us, but the Church really worked 
against us." Though hostility and suspicion prevailed over solidarity — 
hundreds of French Canadian male workers seized the chance to jump into 
the traditionally Jewish skilled trades of pressing and cutting — some of 
the party's emphasis an class solidarity seems to have stuck. 
Fully half of the 10,000 workers who packed Montréal Stadium to hear 
Tim Buck on 28 December 1934 were French Canadians. No doubt 
buoyed by this turnout, the party and its associated organizations defied the 
relentless obstructions of the provincial state with increasing success 
(Québec under Taschereau and Duplessis came closer to genuine fascism 
than anywhere else in the Dominion at this time), and just about achieved 
the level of public activity and recognition that had established de facto 
legality elsewhere in Canada. The CPC did receive one desperate blow to 
its hopes: the premature death of Paul Delisle. As Andrée Lévesque has 
remarked of Delisle, who had returned to Québec in August 1934 after 18 
months at the Lenin School, "son charisme attire les foules." He was not 
easily replaceable. As we see here, however, French Canadian surnames 
became more common in RCMP reports (though hardly abundant; the 
RCMP was well aware that "Roger" was really Stanley Ryerson), and there 
is some evidence that Communists were beginning to develop a discourse 
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30 
tailored to French Canadian cultural sensibilities. Although the bulletins 
suggest that the party's penetration of the French Canadian community 
declined in the latter part of 1935, once again this judgment should not be 
taken at face value. At the very least, Québec was ceasing to be quite so 
exceptional. 
Not all the themes suggested in this volume can be introduced here. One 
last topic, however, demands comment. Ian Angus has shown in some 
detail how 'Tim Buck's Party" was "made" between 1929-1931.^^ The 
1935 bulletins bear witness to the "making" of the man himself and the 
origins of what would become a rather sickening personality cult. Gritted 
teeth may be required to savour the later phases of this process, but we can 
see here some of the personal qualities that made Buck genuinely popular 
(and raise some doubts about Angus's one-sidedness). Buck's personal 
charm has been well-documented: he was polite, affable and modest 
(though Stewart Smith for one thought he had much to be modest about); 
never aloof (unlike Smith), he had time for everyone and the politician's 
invaluable knack of always remembering names. What strikes the reader 
here is his stamina. Buck was not a robust man. He had been quite seriously 
ill with a nervous condition in 1930, and his 1932-34 sojourn in Kingston 
30 
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penitentiary can have done little to restore him to full health; an assassina-
tion attempt must have been particularly unsettling. Yet within weeks of 
his release and triumphal return to Toronto (see 77if Depression Years, Part 
1,439-44), Buck embarked on what must have been an exhausting speaking 
tour of central Canada. Between 23 December and 18 February he ad-
dressed rallies at (chronologically) Toronto, Montréal, Sudbury, North 
Bay, Timmins, South Porcupine, Kirkland Lake, Rouyn-Noranda, Ottawa, 
Montréal (again). Kitchener, Windsor, Hamilton, Niagara Falls and Ottawa 
(again). This last appearance gave him particular satisfaction; it followed 
a long campaign — after the state had made sure that his first appearance 
was a make-do-and-mend affair — to find an appropriately prestigious 
meeting place in the nation's capital. 
Many of these meetings found their way into the RCMF bulletins and 
are recorded here. The face Buck presented to the public was modestly 
triumphant. By the simple device of comparing this meeting with the last 
occasion an which he had addressed the workers of 'X,' he could drive 
home the message that "mass pressure" had created a growing Communist 
movement. His Hamilton audience of 2(XX) can have had little difficulty in 
working out the precise magnitude of this growth; an Buck's previous, 
pre-prison appearance, they learned, only 2(X) had been present. Buck's 
Ontario tour was plainly designed to capitalize on the wave of popular 
sympathy that greeted the release of the party leadership. At an under-
standably gentler pace. Buck maintained the momentum with personal 
appearances all over the country. In July the Seventh Comintern Congress 
underlined his eminence by electing him in absentia to the Comintern's 
Executive Committee. His growing Canadian popularity (in the party's 
terminology, Buck became "much loved" in 1935) was revealed three 
months later, during his campaign for the historic North Winnipeg federal 
seat held by A.A. Heaps of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation 
(CCF). Heaps retained the seat, but Buck's vote of 7,418 was by far the 
highest recorded by any of the CPC's 13 candidates. Buck's last mention 
in the 1935 bulletins underlines his lack of pretension. He had ended 1934 
speaking to a crowd of 17,(XX) at Maple Leaf Gardens. Having become a 
national figure, he ended 1935 addressing a meeting of 50 party and 
non-party students at the University of Toronto. 
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This latest contribution to the Security Bulletins series is an invaluable 
documentary source an the history of Canadian Communism. It does, 
however, contain numerous silences, not all of which are of the "deleted" 
category. It needs, therefore, to be supplemented from the growing pub-
lished record and archival sources. Indeed, thanks to Access to Information 
legislation and the (fingers crossed) impending National Archives' acquisi-
tion of microfilm copies of Comintern archives relating to Canada, his-
torians are in danger of being overwhelmed by primary documentation. 
Even after the arrival of this documentary treasury, the RCMP bulletins 
will remain an accessible, detailed, and convenient introduction to the CPC, 
the security services, and the relations between them. This introduction has 
attempted to flag just a few of the themes on which the 1935 bulletins shed 
light Succeeding volumes, which, thankfully, are as complete, as this one, 
will provide still further illumination. 
